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LIST OP PARTIES 
Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc., a Utah corporation, was named as 
a party in an amended complaint. (R. 42-28.) Pro-Benefit is not a 
party to this appeal. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA 
WOLSEY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants Case No. 930049-CA 
vs. Oral Argument 
: Priority 16 
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment.1 Jurisdiction was 
conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992) . The case was poured over to this Court, 
which has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(k) (Supp. 
1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. May a district court dismiss with prejudice a state claim 
preempted by ERISA? This presents a legal question, which is 
reviewed for correctness. Robertson v. Gem Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 
496, 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment 
on an issue first raised in a reply memorandum and which involved 
disputed factual issues? "When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
xThe judgment disposed of the case against the only party which 
had entered an appearance in the action. An additional defendant 
had been served by publication and was technically a party at the 
time the notice of appeal was filed. (R. 217-215.) Plaintiffs 
will file an appropriate motion to correct any deficiencies in this 
Court's jurisdiction. 
from the facts are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion." Neerincrs v. State Bar, 817 P.2d 320, 
320 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are nos constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is a civil action to recover damages 
for breach of an insurance contract. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. This matter is 
a contractual dispute in which appellant T. Mark Wolsey seeks to 
recover medical expenses incurred in the treatment of his daughter, 
Melissa. After submission of medical bills and attempts at 
settlement, the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 18, 
1991. (R. 12-1.) Plaintiffs moved to amend their Complaint on 
January 14, 1992, to add an additional party defendant. (R. 2 3-
22.) The court granted the motion to amend on February 18, 1992.2 
(R. 176-175.) 
Defendant moved for summary judgment on January 22, 1992, 
asserting that Plaintiffs7 sole remedy was an action in federal 
court under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
2Even though an additional defendant, Pro-Benefit Staffing, 
Inc., was technically joined in the lawsuit, Pro-Benefit was not a 
party to the motion for summary judgment at issue and is not a 
party to this appeal. Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems will 
therefore be referred to as "Defendant." 
2 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. (R. 44-43.) The trial court 
granted the motion, and on September 9, 1992, entered a Judgment 
which dismissed the entire action with prejudice. (R. 207-205.) 
On September 15, 1992, Plaintiffs served a motion to amend the 
judgment to provide for a dismissal without prejudice. (R. 219-
218.) The motion was denied by order entered October 15, 1992. 
(R. 240.) The Wolseys filed a Notice of Appeal on November 10, 
1992. (R. 246-245.) 
Statement of Facts 
Mark Wolsey was insured by the defendant under Claim No. 
91022883-19, Group No. 165. (R. at 42.) Melissa Wolsey, Mr. 
Wolsey's daughter, was also covered by the policy and was injured 
in an accident in Utah County on March 24, 1991. (R. at 41.) The 
accident rendered Ms. Wolsey a paraplegic. She has incurred 
extensive medical bills from the time of the accident until the 
present, for which she has not received insurance compensation. 
(R. at 41.) Mr. Wolsey submitted those medical receipts to 
defendant Intercare Benefit Systems for payment, but Defendant 
refused to disburse funds because of a subrogation dispute. (R. at 
41.) Appellants' counsel attempted to informally negotiate payment 
of the medical expenses, but was unsuccessful. (R. at 41.) This 
breach of contract action followed. 
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SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Wolsey concedes the "employee benefit plan" under which he 
seeks relief is an ERISA plan for purposes of preemption. Despite 
this, when ERISA preempts a state claim, the state court must 
dismiss without prejudice so that a plaintiff may pursue federal 
remedies. Appellee did not request dismissal with prejudice due to 
ERISA preemption, nor was the trial court's dismissal proper. 
The merits of the contractual dispute were not properly before 
the court, since appellee failed to raise the question of contrac-
tual liability until submission of its reply memorandum in support 
of its motion for summary judgment. Further, disputed issues of 
fact remain regarding Mr. Wolsey's relationship with Pro-Staffing 
and whether he was entitled to benefits as a matter of contract. 
No evidence of fraud is found within the record, making the court's 
implicit grant of estoppel improper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION WAS IMPROPER. 
1. Recent Utah Cases Require Plaintiffs To Concede That 
Jurisdiction Was Not Proper In A State Court. 
Plaintiffs argued below that the "employee plan" under which 
they claimed benefits did not meet the ERISA definition of a plan, 
and as a result, their claims could be heard in state court. A 
4 
recent Utah case, Demond v. FHP, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 72 (Ct. App. 
Mar. 8, 1993), when read in conjunction with Robertson v. Gem 
Insurance Co. , 828 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), requires 
defendants to concede that this record shows Pro-Benefit Staffing 
to have exercised sufficient control over its employee plan to 
place that plan within the bounds of federal ERISA protection. 
Plaintiffs therefore withdraw their objection to ERISA preemption 
of their claim. 
2. The Trial Court Had No Jurisdiction To Dismiss Plain-
tiff s' Claims With Prejudice. 
Even though jurisdiction was improper, the trial court erred 
in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The pivotal 
defect in the court's reasoning lies in the remedy it awards. The 
court simply cannot dismiss with prejudice a claim which is 
preempted by ERISA under any circumstances—even if Mr. Wolsey had 
been guilty of the most heinous fraud imaginable (which he most 
emphatically disputes). At the point at which a state court 
determines that ERISA preempts a state claim, that court no longer 
has jurisdiction other than the minimum necessary to direct the 
dismissal of the claim without prejudice. 
Defendant's counsel conceded this point at oral argument: 
But if he's going to retreat from that posi-
tion then he has to say: Yeah, I'm entitled 
to benefits under that plan, and maybe I am an 
employee under that plan. And if he is, then 
ERISA applies and ERISA preemption, and the 
case should be dismissed by this court and Mr. 
Wolsey can look at whatever remedies he has in 
the federal court. 
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(R. at 257) (emphasis supplied). Only when referring to Plain-
tiffs7 argument concerning contractual liability did Defendant 
request dismissal with prejudice. "But I submit if your honor 
dismissed it on the first ground [the contractual argument], that 
would be a dismissal with prejudice." (R. at 257.) Nowhere does 
Defendant argue that a state court can dismiss an ERISA claim with 
prejudice. That is clearly not the intent of the ERISA statute. 
Rather, federal courts seek to develop substantive law which 
provides uniform protection for business relationships governed by 
ERISA. Robertson, 828 P. 2d at 499. The goal of extending uniform 
protections, safeguards and remedies to employees would not be 
furthered if state courts blocked access to federal courts by means 
of prejudicial dismissals. The district court's decision should be 
reversed, and Plaintiffs allowed to pursue their claims and avail 
themselves of federal ERISA protection in federal court. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S ALTERNATIVE HOLDING THAT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED ON CONTRACTUAL 
GROUNDS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The trial court based its decision on alternative grounds. 
The first alternative, addressed above, held that ERISA preemption 
applied and the court lacked jurisdiction. This Point concerns the 
second alternative, which held Plaintiffs were not entitled to 
benefits as a matter of contract. Summary judgment on this issue 
was improper, and the matter should be remanded for trial. 
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As argued above, this point is moot if the Court agrees with 
Plaintiffs' concession that the state courts lack jurisdiction. 
1. The Issue Of Whether Plaintiffs Was Entitled To Benefits 
As A Matter Of Contract Was Not Properly Before The Court. 
The question of whether the Wolseys could recover under the 
contract was not properly raised before the trial court. Defend-
ant's initial motion for summary judgment asserted only one 
argument, that "ERISA law preempts all claims asserted by the 
Wolseys in their Complaint and proposed Amended Complaint." (R. at 
44.) Defendant attempted to raise the contract issue in its reply 
memorandum. (R. 185-177.) Plaintiffs objected to the new issue at 
oral arguments by asserting that the only issue properly before the 
court was jurisdiction. (R. 257, 260.) In addition, defendant's 
request that the entire case be dismissed with prejudice was not 
made until oral arguments. (R. 257.) 
A reply memorandum, by its very label, is designed solely for 
replying to arguments raised in an opposing memorandum, not for 
raising new issues or claims. Claims raised for the first time in 
a reply memorandum should not be considered. White v. Kent Medical 
Center, Inc., P.S., 810 P.2d 4, 8 (1991). The trial court erred by 
granting summary judgment on an issue raised first in a reply 
memorandum. 
2. A Material Issue Of Fact Exists As To Whether Plaintiff 
Was An Employee Entitled To Benefits Under The Contract. 
Summary judgment is a procedural tool available when no 
material facts exist, and a court is justified in rendering a 
7 
decision as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56. However, a 
single assertion of fact under oath is sufficient to overcome a 
motion for summary judgment, because ". . .by definition, summary 
judgments do not resolve factual issues . . . ." DeBry v. Salt 
Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ; see also Arnica 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P. 2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) ("one sworn statement under oath is all that is necessary to 
create a factual issue, thereby precluding the entry of summary 
judgment"). In determining whether to grant a motion under Rule 
56, "[d]oubt as to whether a nonmovant has established a genuine 
issue of material fact should be resolved in favor of permitting 
the party to go to trial." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 107 
(Utah 1992) (citing Rees v. Albertsons, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 
(Utah 1978)). 
Appeals courts use this same standard in reviewing, essential-
ly de novo, a lower court's grant of summary judgment. In 
addition, a strong requirement exists that the reviewing court 
consider all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-
movant. Baldwin v. Burton, 2 07 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Feb. 19, 
1993). 
The district court stated in the alternative that if plaintiff 
was not an employee, he would not be entitled to benefits as a 
matter of contract. (R. at 212.) That supposition is not support-
able. Mr. Wolsey,s affidavit states: 
1. I have been self employed as a 
certified public accountant since 1973. I 
entered into an agreement (attached hereto as 
8 
Exhibit "A") with Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. 
("Pro-Benefit") in January of 1987, 
2. My status as self-employed did not 
change in any way pursuant to the agreement 
with Pro-Benefit. . . . 
(R. 158-157.) He thus indicated his personal belief that the 
contract was a legal device by which he could pay Intercare and 
Pro-Benefit a fee and receive employee and accounting benefits in 
return. In direct contradiction, the Affidavit of James M. 
Beardall states: 
6. One of the plaintiffs, Mark Wolsey, 
was an employee of Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc., 
and was covered by the employee welfare bene-
fit plan. 
(R. 108.) Mr. Beardall felt Mr. Wolsey was an employee, and that 
he was entitled to benefits under the benefit plan. 
While the positions in the two affidavits are somewhat ironic 
in that they each assert facts the court would expect from the 
opposing party, the affidavits and the relevant contractual 
documents create a factual conflict which cannot be resolved by 
summary judgment. They differ as to what the term "employee" 
means, what the legal relationship between the parties was meant to 
encompass, and whether benefits were intended to be paid. The 
trial court acknowledged this conflict by stating: "If the 
documents upon which plaintiff bases his claims are accurate, then 
plaintiff was in fact an employee of Pro-Benefit . . . ." (R. at 
201.) In the court,s view, the contract indicated that Mr. Wolsey 
was legally an employee, notwithstanding his personal belief that 
he had autonomy to do as he pleased. This statement by the court 
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on the face of its own ruling clearly indicates that summary 
judgment on the question was improper, for the court itself 
indicated that a question of material fact exists. This being the 
case, the issue must be remanded for trial. 
3. Plaintiffs Are Not Estopped From Bringing Their Action. 
The district court also indicated in its decision "[if Mr. 
Wolsey were not a legal employee of Pro-Benefit] . . . plaintiff 
would certainly have been a party to a sham or fraud which would 
preclude any recovery." (R. 206.) This assumption is unsupported 
by any significant fact on record. 
"Employee" is a legal term of art which describes a relation-
ship between two persons or entities. Legally and contractually 
speaking, the agreement between Pro-Benefit and Mr. Wolsey was 
specifically written to make Mr. Wolsey eligible for benefits under 
the service agreement. For convenience sake, he was termed an 
"employee," since Pro-Benefit used that device to structure its 
benefit plans. From a personal standpoint, Mr. Wolsey did not 
consider himself an employee, because he remained autonomous in his 
business dealings. He accepted the term in the contract as a 
relationship through which he would pay a fee to Pro-Benefit and 
Defendant to administer a benefit plan for his employees. 
Nothing in the record (other than counsel's arguments) 
indicates any fraud on Mr. Wolsey's part. It is apparent from the 
Affidavit of James M. Beardall that Defendant was fully aware of 
the nature of the relationship between Pro-Benefit and Mr. Wolsey. 
(R. at 107-109.) There was no evidence of any attempt at deceit or 
10 
concealment of any kind. Consequently, summary judgment against 
Plaintiff on this issue was reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in dismissing with prejudice a state 
claim preempted by ERISA. Any dismissal should be without 
prejudice. The court further erred in granting summary judgment in 
the presence of disputed issues of fact. The decision should be 
reversed and this Court should direct entry of a dismissal without 
prejudice. 
DATED this Z ^^ day of March, 1993
 v 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: ^ 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 29th 
day of March, 1993. 
Robert A. Burton, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Robert A, Burton, #0516 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
and 
Wesley C. Argyle, #0123 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA ] 
WOLSEY, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, 
Defendant. ] 
> AFFIDAVIT OF 
I JAMES M. BEARDALL 
Civil No. 910400630 
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
COUNTY OF /fofipg/tSt* > 
I, JAMES M. BEARDALL, being first duly sworn, depose and say 
as follows: 
1. I am an adult in years and am competent to make this 
affidavit. 
2. I am the president of Intercare Benefit Systems. 
102577bc 
2757.475 
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3. On or about February 22, 1990 Intercare Benefit Systems 
entered into an agreement with Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. to serve 
as the contract claims processor for Pro-Benefit Staffing Inc.'s 
employee medical benefit plan. A copy of the claims processing 
service agreement between Intercare Benefit System and Pro-Benefit 
Staffing, Inc. is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. At all relevant times Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. 
maintained a self-funded employee welfare benefit plan to provide 
medical benefits to its employees. A copy of the Summary Plan 
Description of the Pro-Benefit's medical benefit plan is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. 
5. The self-funded medical benefit plan is a welfare plan as 
defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 
6. One of the plaintiffs, Mark Wolsey, was an employee of 
Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc., and was covered by the employee welfare 
benefit plan. 
7. Plaintiffs herein were not employees of Intercare Benefit 
Systems. 
8. Plaintiffs were not in any way associated with Intercare 
Benefit Systems. 
9. There has not been nor is there a contract between 
plaintiffs and Intercare Benefit Systems. 
102577bc 
2757.475 2 
10. Intercare Benefit Systems Inc. is not at the present time 
nor has it ever been an insurance company. 
11. Intercare Benefit Systems does not at the present time 
insure the plaintiffs, nor has Intercare Benefit Systems at any 
time insured the plaintiffs. 
12. As contract claims processor for Pro-Benefit Staffing, 
Inc., Intercare Benefit Systems was subject to the directions of 
the administrator of the welfare benefit plan. 
13. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. was the administrator of the 
welfare benefit plan. 
14. Intercare Benefit Systems followed the directions of the 
plan administrator in paying claims under the plan. 
Further Affiant saith not. 
td^l^S^^ 
JAMES\M. BEARDALL 
me this Subscribed and sworn to be-for-e- Q~^~^ day of January, 
1992. 
NOTARX/Ftl 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
102577bc 
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548) and 
DANIELLE M. FERRON (5605), for: 
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
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Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA 
WOLSEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF T. MARK 
WOLSEY 
Case No. 910400630 
Hon. Cullen Y. Christensen 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
T. Mark Wolsey, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I have been self employed as a certified public accountant since 1973. I 
entered into an agreement (attached hereto as Exhibit "A") with Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. 
("Pro-Benefit") in January of 1987. 
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2. My status as self-employed did not change in any way pursuant to the 
agreement with Pro-Benefit. The operation and management of my business was not modified 
in any way as a result of the agreement with Pro-Benefit. My relationship with my clients was 
not modified in any way. I continued to collect the fees for my services rendered to my clients. 
3. I did not provide services to Pro-Benefit. 
4. Pro-Benefit did not direct my work or supervise me or my work in any way. 
5. Pursuant to the agreement with Pro-Benefit, I wrote semi-monthly checks in 
an amount which included the amount of my salary to Pro-Benefit for which Pro-Benefit in turn 
issued a check back in the amount of my salary after deducting taxes, fees for their services, 
and premium payments for my medical insurance received. This process was required by Pro-
Benefit for Pro-Benefit's purpose of trying to appear to be my employer. 
DATED this J±_ day of February, 1992. 
^%UJA)X, 
T. MARK WOLSEY 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this f ( day of February, 1992. 
Notary Public 
JUUEANNHEEUS 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 8460i 
My Commission Expires < 
May 1a 193* < 
State oJ Utv, \ 
DEC ^ '91 16:23 FRC d01-373-0695 PAGE.QQ2 
PRO-BENEFIT STAFFING INC. 
CLIENT SERVICE AGREEMENT 
HIS AGREEMENT made this day of , 198 between 
RO-BENEFXT STAFFING INC* a Utah corporation hereinafter 
Weired to as PRO-STAFF, with principal offices at 262 East 3900 
South, Suite #114, Salt Like City, Utah $4107, (801)266*6633 and 
T . MARK WOLSEY GFA, , CUENT, of 
provides as follows: 
1. STAFFING 
PRO-STAFF hereby agrees to furnish Client, and Client hereby agrees 
to engage from PRO-STAFF, staffing for ail the Job Function Positions 
listed in the Confidential Data Summary, attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference, upon the terms and conditions 
contained herein. 
1 BENEFITS 
PRO-STAFF shall furnish Client the benefits listed in its Description of 
Benefits, a copy of which is attached hereto, and the provisions of 
which are incorporated herein by reference thereto, 
3. TERM OF AGREEMENT 
This Agreement shall remain in force for the tern specified in the 
Cient Service Application, atached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference (the Initial Tern). Following the Initial Term,: this 
Agreement shall remain in force from month to month (the Extended 
Tern), Client may terminate this Agreement by giving thirty (3.0) days 
wnaen notice to PRO-STAFF at any time daring the term of this 
Agreement, During the Initial Term, PRO-STAFF may terminate this 
Agreement should Client materially breach any of the provisions of this 
Agreement or by written agreement of both parties. During the 
Extended Term, PRO-STAFF nay terminate this Agreement by giving 
thirty (30) days written notice of such termination to GienL 
."*" SERVICE FEES 
;) Clieni shall pay PRO-STAFF a service fee equal to the fee w e 
percentage specified in the Client Service Application multiplied by the 
gross earnings of PRO-STAFF employees filling Job Function 
Positions for the Clieni 
(b) During the Initial Term of this Agreement, PRO-CTAFF may not 
adjust the fee rate percentage except for increases in insurance 
premiums, statutory increases in empioyioent taxes, changes in rates of 
pay, or any changes in the Job Function Positions required by Client* 
During the Extended Term of this Agreement, PRC-STAFF may adjust 
the fee rate percentage for increases in insurance premiums, statutory 
increases in employment taxes, changes in rates of pay, or any changes 
in the Job Function Positions required by Client or upon thirty (30) 
days written notice thereof. 
(c) Any increase in the fee rate percentage for increases in insurance 
premiums, statutory increases in employment taxes, changes in rates of 
payr cr any changes in the Job Function positions shall be effective on 
the date of such increases or changes. 
(d) Services Conditioned upon payment* The services agreed to be 
provided by PRO-STAFF are conditioned upon prompt and immediate 
payment by Client. In the event Client fails to pay any amounts due 
promptly and immediately, PRO-STAFF may, at its sole discretion, 
either suspend or terminate its services under this Agreement with or 
without notice to Client, in such event, any and all staffed employees 
of PRO-STAFF shall automatically become U» employees of Client 
and shall be treated as such in all respects by die parties. 
(e) Client shall pay PRO-STAFF all service fees due in guaranteed 
funds no later than the day precseding the first day of the pay period to 
which such service fees apply. 
(0 Client agrees to verify ail time submissions of PRO-STAFF 
employees. 
(g) If Client believes that any billing ar other communication 
Nitweec the parlies is in error, Client shall immediately notify PRO 
'AFF. 
a. SALARY AND WAGE RATE ADJUSTMENTS 
Client agrees to participate in the periodic evaluation of PRO 
STAFF employees. PRO-STAFF will use these evaluations and Cient 
reconffiencauons to determine salary and wage rate adjustments. 
6. SET-UP FEE 
Client agrees to pay PRO-STAFF a non-refundable one-time set-
up fee in the amount specified in the Client Service Application. 
7. INSURANCE 
(a) PRO-STAFF shall furnish and keep in fall force and effect at all 
times during the term of this Agreement,, workers compensation 
insurance covering all PRO-STAFF employees filling Job Function 
Positions under the terms of this Agreement. PRO-STAFF shall 
provide Client with evidence of this coverage. 
(b) If any PROSTAFF employee Oiling a Job Function Position is to 
drive a vehicle of any lend owned, unowned, hired, or leased by 
Client, Client shall furnish automobile liability insurance on any 
venicie affected. The. policy shall insure against public liability for 
bodily injury and property damage, with a nshxmum combined single 
limit of Three Hundred Thousand Doilan (S300,000.00) and uninsured 
motorist or PIP or equivalent coverage of at least the minimum limits 
required by the State where such "no fault" laws shall apply. Client 
shall cause its insurance carrier to uame those leased employees of 
FRO-STAFF as additional named insureds and issue a Certificate of 
Insurance to PROSTAFF, allowing not less than thirty (30) days 
advance notice of cancellation or material change. 
(c) Client agrees to cause its insurance carrier to name PROSTAFF 
as an additional named insured on Client's general liability insurance 
policy and shall issue a Certificate of Insurance to PROSTAFF, 
allowing not less than thirty (30) days advance notice of cancellation or 
material change. The minimum requirement shall be Five Hundred 
Thousand Dollars (5500,000.00) combined single limit including, but 
not limited to. where applicable, premises operations, 
products/completed operations, contract and broad form property 
damage, independent contractors, personal hrary, host liquor liability 
and full liquor liability. Clients rendering professional services win be 
further required to furnish professional liability coverage as applicable. 
(Depending on the business activities of the client, the minimum limits 
of coverage may require SLOOO.000.00) 
(d) Each party herein, hereby waives any claim in its favor against 
the other by way of subrogation or indemnification which may arise 
during the Initial or Extended Term of the Agreement for any and all 
loss of or damage to any of its property or for bodily injury which bis , 
damage or bodily injury is covered by insurance to the extend that such 
loss or damage is recovered under such policies of insurance as 
required in paragraphs 7 (a), (b) and (c), above.' 
(e) Client agrees to keep in full force and effect all insurance required 
under the terms of this Agreement 
& ADMINISTRATION 
(a) The parties understand and agree that PRO-STAFF is an 
independent contractor and all individuals assigned to Client to fill the 
Job Function Positions art employees of PRO-STAFF. PROSTAFF is 
thereby responsible for such administrative employment matters as 
payment of all federal, state and local employment taxes, providing 
woricers compensation coverage, as well as non-obligatory fringe 
benefit programs for i s employees. PRO-STAFF agrees to hold Client 
harmless from direct out-of-pocket expenses cf Client which may result 
from PRO-STAFFs failure to withhold these taxes or failure to conduct 
itself in accordance with applicable state and federal law. However. 
PRO-STAFF shall not be liable in any event for Client's loss of profits, 
business goodwill or other consequential, special or incidental 
damages. 
(b) PROSTAFF siall have the primary responsibility for hiring, 
training, evaluating, replacing, supervising, disciplining and firing of 
individuals assigned to fill Client's Job Function Positions. 
9. SUPERVISION 
(a) PRO-STAFF snail designate an on-site supervisor for client who 
shall determine ihe procedures to be followed by PRO-STAFF 
employees regarding the time and performance of their duties. Cient 
agrees to cooperate with PRO-STAFF in the formation of such policies 
and procedures and permit PROSTAFF to implement irs policies and 
procedures reianng to PROSTAFF employees. 
(b) Client shall make all non-rouanc dirccuves through ihc designate 
PROSTAFF on-site supervisor. 
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10. APPROVAL OF SUPPLIED STAFF 
PRO-STAFF shall provide employees who are duly qualified and 
skilled in the areas in which their services axe to be utilized. PRO-
STAFF will consult with Client in filling its Job Function Positions, 
but PRO-STAFF has the right to determine which of PRO-STAFFs 
employees shall be designated to fill Client's Job Function Positions. 
Client has the right to reject any employee so furnished* if dissatisfied 
with such employees performance. If any PRO-STAFF employee is 
rejected, PRO-STAFF agrees to furnish a suitable replacement within a 
reasonable tunc 
1L HOLIDAY, SICK LEAVE, AND VACATION PAY 
PRO-STAFF employees shall receive pad holidays, sick leave 
and paid vacations, in accordance w ^ Clients'* existing policies, and 
as provided by the Service Fee designated in the Client Service 
Anoiication. 
l T SAFE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND GOVERNMENT 
COMPLIANCE 
(a) Client agrees to comply with all EEO, health and safety laws, 
regulations, ordinances, directives and rules imposed by controlling 
federal state and local governments, and will immediately report ail 
accidents and injuries of PRO-STAFF employees to PRO-STAFrl 
(b) Client agrees to comply, at its exoense, with any specific 
direcuves from PRO-STAFF, PRO^TAF^s workers condensation 
easier, or any government agency having jurisdiction over the work 
place, health or safety. 
(c) Client shall provide or ensure use of .ail personal protective 
equipment as required by federal state or local laws, regulations, 
ordinances, directives or rules or as deemed necessary by PRO-STAFF 
or PRO-STAFFs workers compensation carrier; 
(d) PRO-CTAFF or its workers compensation earner has the right at 
any scheduled mutually convenient time to inspect Clients premises 
and operations, but is not obligated for such mspecrions. PRO-STAFF 
or its insurers my give reports to Client on conchtons found upon such 
inspections* Neither the insurer nor PRO-STAFF warrants the tcsait of 
such inspections or the absence thereof, or that the operations or 
premises of Client are in compliance with any laws, regulations, codes 
or standards. 
13. HOLD HARMLESS 
Client hereby agrees to indeamify, defend and hold PRO-STAFF 
harmless from and against any and all liability, expense, including 
court costs and attorney fees, and claims for damage of any nature 
whatsoever, whether known or unknown* as though expressly sex forth 
and described herein, which P R O - S T A F F may incur, suffer, become 
liable for, or which may be asserted Qr claimed against PRO-STAFF as 
a result of me acts, errors or omissions of Client including without 
limitation any violation or breach of p^rargraph 12 above by GienL 
14. ASSIGNMENT 
Neither PRO-STAFF nor Client shall assign this Agreement or its 
rights and duties hereunder, or any interest herein, without ths prior 
written consent of the other carry, 
15. INTEGRATION 
This Agreement consulates the entire agreement between the 
pomes with regard to this subject matter, and no other agreement, 
statement, promise or practice between the parties relating to the 
subject matter shall be bmding on the parties «w>e»i specifically 
referred to herein and incorporated herein, by reference thereto. This 
agreement may be changed only be written amendment thereto signed 
bv both parties. 
16. WAIVER 
Failure by either party at any time to require performance by the 
G&crpsRj'or &ckim& bread: cf my proraicrtr cf this Agreement will 
not be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach nor affect the 
effectiveness of this Agreement, nor any part thereof, nor prejudice 
either party as regards to any subsequent action. 
17. NOTICES 
Any notice or demand 10 be given hereunder by either party shall 
be effected by personal delivery i& writing or by registered wiaij, 
postage prepaid, return receipt requested, and 'shall be deemed 
communicated at the time of personal delivery thereof, or twenty-four 
(24) hours after mailing if sent through the **»«H- All notices shall be 
xtticssed to the party s principal place of business, or as set forth m 
this Agreement, but each party may change the address by wnnen 
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notice in accordance with ttu» paragraph. 
18. ATTORNEY FEES 
In the event that any action is brought by either patty hereto as a 
result of a breach or default in any provision of this Agreement, the 
prevailing parry in such action shall be awarded reasonable attorney 
fees and costs from the other party, in addition to any other relief to 
which the party may be entitled. 
19. GOVERNING LAW 
This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
20* PARTIAL INVAUDETY 
Shouid any torn, warrant, covenant, conditon or provision of this 
Agreement be held invalid or unenforceable, the balance thereof shall 
remain in full force and shall stand ai if the uaonfoxceabie or invalid 
part did not CJQSL 
$M>w LiJr Executed &c_ 
PRO-BENEFIT 
By: 
3 I N C 
S/^iu, /T). (derf- —L.CL 
Title 
%d3t\Lt eft-
fSisnannei ( ( ig ture) 
~C/fl*eg, tiki*** *SA-~ 
ic (Print) * T5te Name (Print* 
Revised (11/1/86) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
is? vV%, 
••'A. 9 % ^ 
<f 
T. MARK WOLSEY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, et al 
Defendants. 
% 
% 
CASE NUMBER: 910400630 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on 
the motion of Def Intercare Benefit Systems seeking Summary 
Judgment, The Court has reviewed the file, considered the 
memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, and upon 
being advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Said motion is granted. 
If, as PI contends in his affidavit, he has never 
been an employee of Def Pro-Benefit, PI would not be entitled to 
benefits as a matter of contract. Under such circumstances, PI 
would certainly have been a party to a sham or fraud which should 
preclude any recovery. 
If the documents upon which PI bases his claims are 
accurate, then PI was in fact an employee of Pro-Benefit and Pi's 
claims are preempted by ERISA rules and regulations. 
Dated this !J_ day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Danielle Ferron, Esq. 
Jackson B. Howard, Esq. 
Robert A. Burton, Esq. 
Wesley C. Argyle, Esq. 
CULLEN CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Robert A. Burton, #0516 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
and 
Wesley C. Argyle, #0123 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3017 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA 
WOLSEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, 
Defendant. 
J U D 
Civil 
Judge 
G M E N T 
No. 910400630 
Cullen Y. Christen 
Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems1 motion for summary 
judgment came on for hearing before the court on June 19, 1992, 
at 11:00 A.M. Plaintiff was represented by his attorneys, 
Jackson B. Howard and Danielle Ferron. Defendant Intercare 
Benefit Systems was represented by its attorneys, Robert A. 
Burton and Wesley C. Argyle. The court having reviewed the 
W: 
file, considered memoranda of counsel, entertained argument 
of counsel, and being fully advised, grants defendant 
Intercare Benefit Systems1 motion and finds as follows: 
If, as plaintiff contends in his affidavit, he has 
never been an employee of defendant Pro-Benefit, plaintiff 
would not be entitled to benefits as a matter of contract. 
Under such circumstances, plaintiff would certainly have been a 
party to a sham or fraud which would preclude any recovery. 
If the documents upon which plaintiff bases his claim 
are accurate, then plaintiff was in fact an employee of Pro-
Benefit and plaintifffs claims are preempted by ERISA rules and 
regulations. 
Based upon the foregoing findings and in light of sworn 
testimony given by plaintiff in his affidavit, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's amended complaint against Intercare 
Benefit Systems be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems be and hereby 
is awarded judgment in its favor and against plaintiff, T. Mark 
Wolsey, no cause of action. 
CULLEN Yi/ CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of August, 1992, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment, 
first-class postage affixed, to: 
Jackson Howard 
Danielle M. Ferron 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
120 East 300 North Street 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
:0. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
T. MARK WOLSEY et al 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: 910400630 
vs. RULING 
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS 
Defendant. 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on 
the motion of PI seeking an Order amdneding Judgment. The Court 
has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, no 
oral argument being requested, and upon being advised in the 
premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Said motion is denied. 
Dated this 15th day of October, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
CULLEN Y^CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
cc: Danielle M. Ferron, Esq. 
Robert A. Burton, Esq. 
Wesley C. Argyle, Esq. 
4TH DISTRICT C O W 
STAT* ^ L'TAH 
Nov 3 3 
Robert A. Burton, #0516 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
and 
Wesley C. Argyle, #0123 
1245 Brickyard Road, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA 
WOLSEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
) O R D E R 
vs. 
) Civil No. 910400630 
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, 
) Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs' motion to amend the judgment was considered 
by the court under Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
The court having reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of 
counsel, and being fully advised, issued a ruling dated 
October 15, 1992, wherein it denied plaintiffs' motion; 
accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
>4 
plaintiffs1 motion to amend the judgment dated September 9, 
1992, be and hereby is denied. 
Dated this ^ day of QtrCUSSr, 19 92. 
BY THE COURT: 
lJudge Cul Christensen 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of October, 1992, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Order, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Jackson Howard and 
Danielle M. Ferron 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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